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Abstract 
Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for 
promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group 
members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, 
however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members 
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when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the 
extant literature, and compare this with more recent work and new evidence showing how 
concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Social dilemmas stem from the misalignment of individual and group incentives. The 
optimal decision of a self-interested individual is in conflict with what is best from a societal 
view. A classic example, and one that we focus on here, is the situation where individuals can 
voluntarily contribute to public good provision. While all members of a group benefit when an 
individual contributes to the public good, each individual in the group has a private incentive to 
free-ride. Standard economic theory, based on the assumption that individuals maximize their 
own payoff, predicts under-provision relative to the social optimum. There is a long tradition in 
economics of studying mechanisms that may improve matters, for example by introducing 
externally-imposed incentives to encourage contributions and discourage free-riding such as 
subsidies to contributors or taxes on free-riders. Chen (2008) describes many of these 
mechanisms and reviews related experimental research. 
An important alternative approach relies on self-governance (Ostrom, 1990). Here, rather 
than relying on externally-imposed incentives, groups may design institutional arrangements that 
let individual group members set and enforce their own norms of cooperation, by voluntarily 
rewarding fellow group members who contribute and/or by punishing those who free-ride. Most 
of the literature in economics has focused on arrangements that involve decentralized incentive 
systems whereby all group members can monitor and reward/punish each other. However, in 
many settings the power to reward or punish is not distributed equally across all group members, 
and is often concentrated in the hands of a central monitor. This raises a natural question of how 
the distribution of reward and punishment power affects their success in promoting cooperation. 
The focus of this article is to address this question. To do this, in Section 2 we survey the 
existing experimental economics literature on decentralized and centralized incentive systems. 
We focus on discretionary incentives, where group members can voluntarily reward or punish 
others as opposed to externally-imposed incentives, where group members react to 
institutionalized rewards and/or punishments.1 In Section 3, we report a new experiment that 
examines the relative success of decentralized and centralized rewards and punishments in 
1
 Examples of institutionalized incentives are studied in Andreoni and Gee (2012); Croson et al. (2007); Dickinson 
and Isaac (1998); Dickinson (2001); Falkinger et al. (2000); Fatás et al. (2010). Also related is Yamagishi (1986), 
ZKHUHSOD\HUVFDQFRQWULEXWHWRDFHQWUDOL]HGµVDQFWLRQLQJIXQG¶ZKLFKLVWKHQXVHGWRPHWHRXWVDQFWLRQVRQORZ
contributors (see also Sigmund et al., 2010). 
1 
sustaining cooperation. Section 4 offers some concluding comments on the broader 
implications of these findings. 
2. THE USE OF INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 
One of the most extensively used frameworks for the study of cooperation in groups is the 
µSXEOLFJRRGVJDPH¶3**KHQFHIRUWK7KHUHDUHn players, each endowed with E tokens. Each 
SOD\HUFKRRVHVKRZPDQ\WRNHQVWRSODFHLQDµSULYDWHDFFRXQW¶DQGKRZPDQ\WRSODFHin a 
µJURXSDFFRXQW¶$SOD\HUUHFHLYHVDPRQHWDU\SD\RIIRIĮfrom each token placed in her private 
account. Each token a player contributes to the group account generates a return nfl, which is 
equally shared among all n members of the group. Thus, from each token she contributes to the 
group account a player receives a monetary payoff of fl. The game is parameterized such that 
players have a private incentive to allocate all tokens to private accounts (IOĮ), whereas the 
group as a whole would maximize monetary payoffs if all players fully contributed to the group 
account (QIO!Į). Thus, tokens placed in the group account are akin to contributions to a public 
good, and this game captures the tension between private and collective interests which lies at 
the heart of social dilemmas.2 
A large number of economic experiments have studied behavior in the PGG (see 
Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995 for reviews of the literature). A stylized finding is that, although 
individuals do make positive contributions to the public good, contribution levels typically fall 
substantially short of the socially efficient level. Moreover, contributions tend to decline with 
repetition, and full free-riding often prevails towards the end of an experiment. Thus, incentives 
to free-ride undermine cooperation in PGGs, and the design of institutional arrangements that 
induce individuals to eschew narrow self-interest and promote cooperation is thus an important 
issue, which has attracted ubiquitous interest among behavioral scientists. 
In this section we review two such arrangements: the use of sanctions against free-riders 
vis-à-vis the use of rewards for cooperators. In particular, we will review evidence from 
economic experiments on the effectiveness of punishment and reward incentives when these are 
administered through a decentralized system, whereby each group member monitors and 
2
 This framework in which tokens are allocated between private and group accounts was introduced by Marwell 
and Ames (1979); Isaac et al. (1984) modified their design to introduce the version described above. 
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sanctions/rewards other group members, or through a centralized system, whereby the power to 
administer the incentives is concentrated in the hands of a restricted number of group members. 
Standard theory predicts that the opportunity to punish or reward other group members 
will have no effect on cooperation: costly punishment/reward reduces earnings and so should 
not be used by a self-interested individual. Knowing this, individuals should not be deterred 
from pursuing their selfish interests by the threat of punishment, or the promise of rewards. 
Nevertheless, as we discuss in the next sub-section, the availability of punishments and/or 
rewards can promote cooperation and increase public good provision relative to settings where 
discretionary incentives are unavailable. 
2.1 Decentralized (Peer-to-Peer) Punishments and Rewards 
Most of the economics literature has focused on decentralized (peer-to-peer) incentives, 
which can be used by all group members to reward or punish each other. The vast majority of 
studies have focused on punishment incentives (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 
2002).3 Fehr and Gächter (2000), for example, use a two-stage PGG. In the first stage, players 
choose a contribution level as in the standard game described earlier. In the second stage players 
learn the contributions of the other members of their group and then simultaneously decide 
whether WRDVVLJQµSXQLVKPHQWWRNHQV¶WRHDFKJURXSPHPEHU(DFKDVVLJQHGWRNHQLVFRVWO\WR
both the punishing and the punished player. The availability of peer-to-peer punishment is found 
to significantly increase contributions relative to the standard PGG: averaging across all periods 
and treatments reported in Fehr and Gächter (2000), players contribute about 25% of their 
endowment in the game without punishment, and 67% in the game with punishment.4 Moreover, 
the availability of punishment incentives stabilizes cooperation: in the games with punishment 
contributions do not decrease as in the standard game without punishment, and can increase over 
time to converge to nearly full cooperation. These findings have been widely replicated in the 
literature (for recent surveys see, e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011, Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Shinada 
and Yamagishi, 2008), and suggest that decentralized punishment systems can provide powerful 
incentives to cooperate in social dilemmas. 
3
 There are parallel literatures focusing on punishment incentives in other related social dilemmas, such as common 
SRROUHVRXUFHGLOHPPDV2VWURPHWDORUSULVRQHU¶VGLOHPPDV&DOGZHOO 
4
 3XQLVKPHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVLQFUHDVHFRQWULEXWLRQVERWKLQD³SDUWQHU´ treatment, where players are matched with the 
VDPHRWKHUJURXSPHPEHUVUHSHDWHGO\DQGD³VWUDQJHU´WUHDWPHQWZKHUHSOD\HUVDUHUH-matched into new groups 
after each period, though contributions are lower in the latter treatment. 
3 
The effectiveness of punishment incentives has also been shown to vary with the 
punishment technology. In particular, the use of a punishment token imposes costs on both 
punisher and punishee, and cooperation rates are generally higher and more stable with higher 
impact-to-FRVWUDWLRVHJ(JDVDQG5LHGO1LNLIRUDNLVDQG1RUPDQQµ/RZ-SRZHU¶
punishments with a 1:1 impact-to-cost ratio are not always successful in encouraging cooperation 
in PGGs. For example, while Masclet and Villeval (2008) and Sutter et al. (2010) find that 1:1 
punishments significantly increase contributions relative to a standard PGG with no punishment, 
Egas and Riedl (2008), Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) and Sefton et al. (2007) find that 1:1 
punishments are ineffective. 
In contrast to the abundant evidence on the effectiveness of punishments, the use of 
rewards to promote cooperation has received less attention in the experimental literature. Sefton 
et al. (2007) studied a two-stage PGG where, in the first stage, players choose a contribution to 
WKHSXEOLFJRRGDQGLQWKHVHFRQGVWDJHDIWHUKDYLQJREVHUYHGRWKHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVSOD\HUVFDQ
DVVLJQµUHZDUGWRNHQV¶WRHDFKRWKHU(DFKWRNHQDVVLJQHGLVFRVWO\WRWKHUHZDUGLQJSOD\HUKHU
earnings decrease by $0.10), and increases the earnings of the rewarded player (also by $0.10). 
Sefton et al. (2007) find that the availability of rewards increases contributions relative to a 
standard PGG with no rewards or punishments, although the effect is small (subjects contribute 
43% of their endowment in the standard PGG and 59% in the game with rewards) and is 
statistically significant only at the 10% level. Moreover, rewards do not stabilize cooperation: in 
the last period of the game with rewards contributions are actually lower (albeit not significantly 
so) than in the standard game with no punishment/reward incentives. 
Other studies have confirmed that when rewards are pure monetary transfers between 
players, as in Sefton et al. they have only a weak (and mostly statistically insignificant) impact 
on cooperation rates in PGG experiments (Drouvelis and Jamison, 2012; Sutter et al., 2010; 
:DONHUDQG+DOORUDQ+RZHYHULIWKHLPSDFWRIWKHUHZDUGRQWKHUHZDUGHGSOD\HU¶V
payoff exceeds the cost of using the instrument, rewards have been found to be effective in 
HQFRXUDJLQJFRRSHUDWLRQ5DQGHWDODQG6XWWHUHWDOERWKXVLQJµKLJK-SRZHU¶ 
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rewards with a 3:1 impact-to-cost ratio). Moreover, high-power rewards are as effective as high-
power punishments (Drouvelis, 2010; Rand et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010).5 
These findings point to a potential limitation on the use of rewards to encourage 
cooperation in social dilemmas: rewards can be expected to be effective only when the cost of 
assigning the reward is outweighed by the benefits that accrue to the recipient of the reward. 
:KLOHWKHUHPD\EHVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHUHFLSLHQW¶VYDOXDWLRQRIWKHUHZDUGH[FHHGVWhe cost of 
delivering it (e.g., the awards and perks used in employee recognition programs usually impose 
modest costs on the firm but may have special value to employees), in many settings rewards 
that generate direct net benefits may be unavailable. 
In summary, the findings in the literature suggest that both peer-to-peer punishments and 
rewards can effectively promote cooperation in social dilemmas.6 Crucial to the effectiveness of 
either instrument is the ratio of the benefit/cost of receiving the reward/punishment to the cost of 
delivering it. High-power rewards and punishments are both beneficial for cooperation. For a 
given effect on cooperation, rewards have an efficiency-advantage over the punishment 
instrument since the mere use of high-power rewards raises joint payoffs (e.g. Rand et al., 2009; 
Sutter et al., 2010). In contrast, punishment can enhance efficiency only if the efficiency gains 
from higher contributions exceed the social loss associated with the use of the instrument (see, 
e.g., Ambrus and Greiner, 2012; Gächter et al., 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008). Thus, while the 
instruments may be similarly effective in raising contribution levels, (high-power) rewards may 
be preferred to sanctions on efficiency grounds. On the other hand, there is mixed evidence that 
low-power punishments are effective in raising contributions in PGG experiments, and low-
power rewards have largely been found to be ineffective. 
5
 For a review of the relative effectiveness of peer rewards and peer punishment see Milinski and Rockenbach 
(2012). See Balliet et al. (2011) for further discussion and for a meta-analysis of the effectiveness of discretionary 
and non-discretionary incentives. 
6
 Some studies have examined whether the joint availability of punishments and rewards can further increase 
cooperation. Results are mixed. Sefton et al. (2007) find that contributions are highest when group members can use 
both instruments. Rand et al. (2009) find that combining punishments and rewards does not lead to higher 
contributions than when only punishment or only rewards can be used. Finally, in Drouvelis and Jamison (2012) 
contributions are higher when both instruments are available than when only rewards are available, but the joint 
availability of punishments and rewards does not increase contributions relative to a treatment where only 
punishment is available (however, note that in their experiment the punishment instrument displays a 3:1 impact-to-
cost ratio, while the reward instrument has a 1:1 ratio). 
5 
2.2 Centralized Punishments and Rewards 
While the literature reviewed above suggests that peer-to-peer incentives can successfully 
promote cooperation, there are also settings where they fail to do so. One problematic aspect of 
the use of peer-to-peer rewards and punishments is that is that some players may misuse 
incentives and actually use them to undermine cooperation. For instance, several experiments 
with peer-to-SHHUSXQLVKPHQWKDYHGRFXPHQWHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIµDQWLVRFLDO¶RUµSHUYHUVH¶
punishment whereby sanctions are used against contributors rather than free-riders with 
detrimental effects on cooperation (see, for example, Herrmann et al., 2008, Gächter and 
Herrmann, 2009, or Gächter and Herrmann, 2011).7 A second issue concerns the potential 
inefficiencies that may arise if individuals fail to coordinate their punishment or rewarding 
activities such that too much (or too little) punishment and/or rewarding are meted out. This may 
be particularly problematic in the case of an excessive use of punishment, due to its associated 
social inefficiencies. The coordination problems may be further aggravated by the existence of a 
(second-order) free-rider problem in the use of incentives: since punishing and/or rewarding 
others is costly, each individual would prefer that someone else bears the burden of enforcing the 
norm of cooperation (Elster, 1989; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
Perhaps as a consequence of these difficulties, some groups and societies have developed 
centralized systems to administer incentives. In such systems, the role of disciplining group 
PHPEHUVLVGHOHJDWHGWRRQHRUPRUHDXWKRULW\ILJXUHVµPRQLWRUV¶WKDWKDYHH[FOXVLYHXVHRIWKH
punishment and/or reward instruments. Ostrom (1990), for example, discusses the case of the 
Hirano, Nagaike and Yamanoka villages in Japan, where the monitoring and sanctioning functions 
ZHUHGHOHJDWHGWRµGHWHFWLYHV¶ZKRSDWUROOHGWKHFRPPXQDOO\RZQHGODQGVDQGFROOHFWHGILQHV
from villagers caught using the lands without authorization. In some villages, the role of 
µGHWHFWLYH¶ZDVWDNHQXSE\DOOHOLJLEOHPDOHYLOODJHUVRQDURWDWLQJEDVLV8 Pirate societies are 
another example of self-organizing groups facing social dilemmas (e.g. in the provision of effort 
during a plunder) who delegated the administration of discipline to a central authority. The 
7
 Several studies have examined whether further punishment stages, in which players can punish punishing 
behaviors, may be a way to discipline perverse or anti-social punishment. Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) find that 
DOORZLQJVXFK³VHFRQG-RUGHUSXQLVKPHQW´KDVOLWWOHHIIHFWLQGHWHUULQJSHUYHUVHSXQLVKPHQWDQGLQIDFWWKH\REVHUYH
another form of perverse second-order punishment where the punishers of free-riders are punished. Moreover, 
Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008) find that allowing second-order punishment can even have a 
negative effect on cooperation. 
8
 6LPLODUSRVLWLRQVRIµJXDUGV¶KDYHEHHQFUHDWHGE\VHOI-organizing groups for the management of irrigation and 
forestal systems (see Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 1999). 
6 
SRZHU³to allocate provisions, select and distribute loot (...) and adjudicate crew member 
conßicts/administer discipline´ was transferred from pirate crews into the hands of elected 
TXDUWHUPDVWHUVZKRWRJHWKHUZLWKVKLSFDSWDLQVDFWHGDVµVRFLDOOHDGHUV¶LQSLUDWHVRFLHWLHV
(Leeson, 2007, p. 1065; see also Leeson, 2009). A further, more contemporary example of 
centralized incentive systems can be found in the arrangement of team incentives in 
organizations, where the role of administering reward and punishment incentives to team 
members is concentrated in the hands of a team leader or supervisor. 
Delegation of the disciplining power to a central monitor can successfully solve some of 
the issues of peer-to-peer incentives outlined above. For example, centralizing the use of 
incentives may eliminate or reduce the inefficiencies arising from the miscoordination of 
punishing/rewarding activities. The second-order free-riding problem may also be mitigated in 
the sense that, although the use of incentives is still costly, monitors know that they cannot free-
ULGHRQRWKHUV¶PRQLWRULQJHIIRUWV0RUHRYHUWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHSXQishment and reward 
instruments may increase when the use of the instruments is centralized. For instance, a monitor 
who can make a coordinated use of the group resources that are earmarked for the disciplining 
activity may be able to inflict a harsher punishment upon a free-rider than if the sanctioning 
resources are diffused across group members. Similarly, the disciplining effect of rewards may 
increase if these are concentrated in the hands of a monitor who has discretion to allocate or 
withhold the funds from group members. 
On the other hand, there are also potential disadvantages associated with centralized 
incentive systems. Installing a central monitor to administer the group punishing/rewarding 
resources does not solve the issue whether the incentives will be used in the best interest of the 
group. In fact, monitors may face stronger incentives than group members to abuse their power. 
For example, monitors may be tempted to underuse the resources earmarked for the monitoring 
and disciplining activities if they are residual claimants of such resources. Analogously, monitors 
may be tempted to overuse the resources at their disposal, e.g. if they can keep a share of the 
fines collected from the sanctioned individuals. This discussion highlights the importance of 
keeping monitors accountable to the group for their activities (Ostrom, 1990). A further issue, 
discussed in Balliet et al. (2011), regards the relation between monitors and group members. If 
PRQLWRUVDUHSHUFHLYHGDVµRXW-JURXSV¶ZKRDUHH[WUDQHRus to the group, this may undermine 
group cohesion with negative effects on cooperation. 
7 
Overall, the discussion above raises interesting questions about the relative effectiveness 
of centralized incentive systems vis-à-vis decentralized systems in social dilemma settings. 
Surprisingly, very few experimental studies in economics have focused on centralized 
punishment and reward systems.9 One such study is van der Heijden et al. (2009), who examine 
a team production setting where team members automatically receive an equal share of the team 
output irrespective of their contribution to team production. This setting is analogous to the 
public goods setting, and complete free-riding is the unique equilibrium. Van der Heijden et al. 
(2009) compare this setting to one where the distribution of team output is not automatic, but 
LQVWHDGLVDGPLQLVWHUHGE\DµWHDPOHDGHU¶7KHWHDPOHDGHUFDQPRQLWRURWKHUWHDPPHPEHUV¶
contributions and decide how to allocate team output amongst team members. In this setting 
team leaders face the temptation to keep the whole team output for themselves, and thus it is 
unclear whether they can successfully promote cooperation. In fact, van der Heijden et al. 
(2009) find that the introduction of a team leader significantly increases average team 
contributions by 73%, and team earnings by 37%. However, not all teams perform well under a 
team leader: cooperation breaks down when team leaders abuse their power and distribute 
output unfairly among team members. 
Another study focusing on centralized incentives is Gürerk et al. (2009). They study a team 
production game where, after all team members have made a contribution to team production and 
received an equal share of team output, one team member (the team leader) receives a monetary 
budget that she can use to discipline team members. Team leaders can choose the type of 
incentives that they will have available in the game: they can choose to discipline team members 
using either punishments or rewards. Gürerk et al. (2009) find that team leaders are initially 
reluctant to choose the punishment instrument, and almost all team leaders commit to using the 
reward instrument instead. However, rewards are less effective than punishments in encouraging 
team members to contribute: contributions decline over time when rewards are used, whereas 
there is an increasing trend in contributions under punishment incentives. As a consequence, 
OHDGHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHIRUUHZDUGVWHQGVWRGLPLQLVKRYHUWLPH10 
9
 Eckel et al. (2010VWXG\D³VWDU-QHWZRUN´VHWWLQJZKHUHRQHSOD\HURFFXSLHVDFHQWUDOSRVLWLRQEXWWKDWSOD\HUFDQ
be punished as well as punish. Thus, although punishment power is asymmetrically distributed across group 
members, it is not centralized in the hands of one player. Similarly, Leibbrandt et al. (2012) and Nikiforakis et al. 
(2010) study punishment mechanisms with asymmetric (but not centralized) distributions of the power to punish. 
10
 A similar finding is reported in Gürerk et al. (2006) for decentralized incentive systems. 
8 
These two studies suggest that centralized incentive systems can successfully promote 
cooperation in social dilemmas. Nevertheless, some of the empirical findings (e.g., the 
heterogeneity in team success under leaders in van der Heijden et al., 2009) highlight the 
concerns discussed above about the potential pitfalls of centralized systems. Moreover, since 
neither study includes treatments where subjects can mutually monitor and punish/reward each 
other, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the relative success of centralized systems vis-à-
vis decentralized systems. 
Two recent studies which do include a comparison between centralized and decentralized 
LQFHQWLYHV\VWHPVDUH2¶Gorman et al. (2009) and Carpenter et al. (2012). Both studies focus on 
SXQLVKPHQWLQFHQWLYHV2¶*RUPDQHWDOVWXG\D3**ZLWKWZRW\SHVRIVDQFWLRQLQJ
systems: one treatment uses the standard mutual monitoring system (peer-to-peer punishment), 
whereas the other treatment uses a centralized monitoring system whereby only one group 
PHPEHUUDQGRPO\VHOHFWHGHDFKSHULRGFDQSXQLVKJURXSPHPEHUV2¶*RUPDQHWDO
find that in a treatment without punishment contributions display the usual decreasing trend over 
time, and average contributions are significantly lower than in either punishment treatment. 
Contributions do not differ significantly between the centralized and peer-to-peer punishment 
treatments, but average earnings are significantly higher with centralized punishment than with 
peer-to-peer punishment, suggesting that a more coordinated use of punishment power can 
reduce efficiency losses. 
Carpenter et al. (2012) also study a PGG and compare a treatment with peer-to-peer 
punishment and a treatment where the monitoring and punishment power is concentrated in the 
KDQGVRIRQHJURXSPHPEHU,QFRQWUDVWWR2¶*RUPDQHWDO&DUSHQWHUHWDOUHSRUW
higher contributions under peer-to-peer punishment (where subjects on average contribute 56% 
of their endowment) than in the treatment with centralized punishment (where average 
contributions are 33% of the endowment). Average earnings are also higher under peer-to-peer 
than centralized punishment. There are several differences in the experimental designs of the 
2¶*RUPDQHWDODQG&DUSHQWHUHWDOEXWSHUKDSVDSRWHQWLDOH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKH
GLIIHUHQWILQGLQJVUHSRUWHGLQWKHWZRVWXGLHVLVWKDWLQ2¶*RUPDQHWDOWKHUROHRIFHQWUDO
monitor was randomly assigned to a new subject in each new round of play, whereas in 
Carpenter et al. (2012) roles remained constant throughout the experiment. Assigning the role of 
FHQWUDOPRQLWRURQDURWDWLQJEDVHDVLQ2¶*RUPDQHWDOPD\DWWHQXDWHWKHQHJDWLYH 
9 
LPSDFWWKDWWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIDµEDGPRQLWRU¶HJDPRQLWRUZKRQHYHUVDQFWLRQVIUHH-riding) 
may have on contribution dynamics, and may thus explain the different success of the centralized 
system across the two studies.11 
While the studies reviewed above shed some light on the effectiveness of centralized 
incentives systems in sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas, several important questions 
UHPDLQXQDQVZHUHG)LUVWZKLOHWKHVWXGLHVE\2¶*RUPDQHWDODQG&DUSHQWHUet al. (2012) 
allow a comparison between centralized and decentralized punishment systems, we are not aware 
of any study comparing centralized and decentralized reward systems. Second, with the 
exception of van der Heijden et al. (2009), all other studies KDYHH[DPLQHGµKLJK-SRZHU¶
incentives (with either a 3:1 or 2:1 impact-to-cost ratio). As discussed in the previous sub-section, 
µKLJK-SRZHU¶SHHU-to-peer punishments and rewards are usually very successful in encouraging 
cooperation in social dilemmas, and so it seems that there may be little scope for centralized 
systems to improve over this. An interesting question is whether concentrating 
punishment/reward power can improve the success of incentives in environments where peer-to-
peer incentives have been less successful in encouraging cooperation. In this sense, the result 
reported in van der Heijden et al. (2009) that concentrating rewards in the hands of a leader is 
beneficial for cooperation is interesting because most of the literature on 1:1 peer-to-peer rewards 
find them to be ineffective, and so this suggests that concentrating reward power may increase the 
effectiveness of the instrument. In the next section we report a new experiment to shed light on 
some of these questions. 
3. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED INCENTIVES: NEW EVIDENCE 
3.1 Design and Procedures 
The new experiment used 150 volunteer participants, randomly matched into three-person 
groups.12 All groups played a two-stage PGG, repeated over ten periods in fixed groups. In stage 
11
 Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) study a rather different sort of centralized punishment institution where a third-
party (i.e. a player external to the group who neither contributes nor benefits from contributions) is responsible for 
punishment. They find that centralized punishment is most effective where the third-party is elected rather than 
randomly appointed. Relatedly, Grechenig et al. (2012) study a centralized punishment institution where a player 
H[WHUQDOWRWKHJURXSFRQWUROVWKHDOORFDWLRQRIJURXSPHPEHUV¶SXQLVKPHQWUHVRXUFHV7KHLUIRFXVKRZHYHULVRQ
JURXSPHPEHUV¶FKRLFHVEHWZHHQWKLVFHQWUDOL]HG-punishment institution and standard decentralized and no-
SXQLVKPHQWLQVWLWXWLRQV,QWKHVHWWLQJPRVWVLPLODUWRWKRVHVWXGLHGLQ2¶*RUPDQHWDODQG&DUSHQWHUHWDO
(2012), they find that subjects prefer decentralized punishment to centralized and no-punishment institutions. 
10 
one each player received an endowment of 20 tokens and had to choose how many to allocate to 
a public account and how many to keep in a private account. A player earned 3 points for each 
token she kept in her private account, and 2 points from each token allocated to the public 
account (regardless of which group member had contributed it). At the end of the stage players 
were informed of the decisions and earnings of each group member. In stage two 24 additional 
tokens were given to each group and these could be used to either increase own-earnings, or 
reward or punish other group members, depending on treatment. At the end of stage two players 
were informed of the stage two decisions and earnings of each group member. Players were then 
informed of their total earnings for the period, these being the sum of their earnings from the 
two stages. 
Altogether we had five treatments, with ten groups in each treatment. In our Baseline 
treatment 8 stage-two tokens were plaFHGLQHDFKSOD\HU¶VSULYDWHDFFRXQW\LHOGLQJSRLQWVSHU
token. In our mutual monitoring treatments each player was given 8 stage-two tokens that could 
be kept in a private account, yielding 3 points per token, or assigned to other group members. In 
our Mutual-Punish treatment a token assigned to a group member reduced her earnings by 3 
points, while in our Mutual-Reward treatment each stage two token assigned to a group member 
increased her earnings by three points. Based on the previous research discussed earlier we 
expected that the effect of allowing 1:1 rewards or punishment would be quite weak, allowing 
for the possibility that concentrating reward/punishment power would increase the effectiveness 
of rewards or punishment. 
In our central monitoring treatments all punishment/reward power was concentrated in the 
hands of one, randomly assigned, group member (this was the same group member in all ten 
SHULRGV7KLVJURXSPHPEHUWKHµFHQWUDOPRQLWRU¶ZDVJLYHQWRNHQVLQVWDJHWZRDQGWKHVH
could be placed in her private account, yielding 3 points per token, or assigned to other group 
PHPEHUV$VVLJQLQJDWRNHQUHGXFHGWKHDVVLJQHH¶VHDUQLQJVE\WKUHHSRLQWVLQWKHCentral-
Punish treatment, and increased her earnings by three points in the Central-Reward treatment.13 
12
 The experiment was conducted in multiple sessions in the CeDEx computerized laboratory at the University of 
Nottingham in Spring 2012. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the software was written in 
z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A copy of experimental materials is available in the Appendix. 
13
 In addition to earnings from each period we gave each participant an initial point balance of 320 points (which 
covered any potential losses in the treatments allowing punishment). At the end of a session the initial balance plus 
accumulated point earnings from all periods was converted into cash at a rate of £0.75 per point. Participants 
earned, on average, £11.10 for a session lasting between 30 and 60 minutes. 
11 
Our parameters were chosen to satisfy two criteria that we considered may be important for 
the successful administration of incentives. First, we chose parameters to give central monitors 
the ability to discipline. A group member can increase her stage one earnings by 20 points by 
keeping all her tokens rather than contributing them. We wanted to give the central monitor 
sufficiently many stage two tokens so that she could reduce a free-ULGHU¶VVWDJHWZRHDUQLQJVE\DW
least 20 points by withholding rewards in the Central-Reward treatment. With 24 stage two 
tokens a monitor could employ a strategy of rewarding full contributors with 8 tokens and 
withholding rewards from free-riders. Against this strategy a defector gains 20 points in stage one 
and loses 24 points in stage two, and so this strategy effectively disciplines free-riders. Second, 
we wanted to give central monitors an incentive to discipline. Since the central monitor could 
free-ride in stage one and keep all her stage two tokens, giving a payoff of at least (20 x 3) + (24 
x 3) = 132 points, we wanted the payoff from full contribution and an equal allocation of reward 
tokens to be higher than this. With our parameters the central monitor receives (60 x 2) + 
(8 x 3) = 144 points when the group contributes fully and she rewards equally. 
3.2 Results 
As seen in Figure 1, our Baseline treatment exhibits the standard pattern observed in 
previous public goods experiments. Average contributions start out around 60% of endowments 
and steadily decline with repetition to 20% of endowments in period ten. Across all rounds 
participants contribute, on average, 43% of their endowments. Relative to this, we find that peer 
punishment is highly effective. Averaging across all periods participants contribute 89% of their 
endowments in the Mutual-Punish treatment. This difference in average contributions is highly 
significant (p = 0.001).14 In contrast, peer rewards are ineffective: average contributions in the 
Mutual-Reward treatment are 45% of endowments, not significantly different from Baseline (p = 
0.821). These findings are qualitatively consistent with the findings from exogenous 1:1 
treatments reported in Sutter et al. (2010). However, punishment is much more effective in our 
study, perhaps reflecting the stronger punishment technology.15 
14
 All p-values are based on two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests treating each group as a unit of observation. 
15
 In their study the gain to a player from free-riding completely rather than contributing fully was 8 experimental 
currency units, whereas the most punishment that a player could receive was 3 experimental currency units. 
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Period 
Baseline Mutual-Reward Central-Reward 
Mutual-Punish Central-Punish 
 
Figure 1: Average contributions to public good across periods. 
Turning to our Central-Punish treatment, we find that concentrating punishment power 
reduces the effectiveness of punishment. Contributions are 55% of endowments in Central-
Punish, significantly lower than in Mutual-Punish (p = 0.038). In fact, when punishment is left to 
a central monitor average contributions are not significantly different from Baseline (p = 0.571). 
Concentrating reward power, on the other hand, results in a small, but insignificant, increase in 
contributions. Average contributions in Central-Reward are 56% of endowments, not 
significantly different from Mutual-Reward (p = 0.406) or Baseline (p = 0.406). 
Differences between the Mutual-Punish treatment and the other treatments are also 
evident in Figure 2, which shows the distribution of contributions, pooling over all periods. 
While in the Mutual-Punish treatment only 5% of decisions were to contribute zero, in all other 
treatments around 30% of contribution decisions result in extreme free-riding. At the other 
extreme, in the Mutual-Punish treatment players contribute 20 tokens 78% of the time, twice as 
often as in any other treatment. In turn, full contributions are twice as frequent in the centralized 
monitoring treatments as in Baseline (39% in Central-Punish, 38% in Central-Reward, and 18% 
in Baseline). 
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Figure 2. Distribution of individual contributions to public good. 
Differences between treatments seem most strong for the case of maximal contributions. 
While the proportion of maximal contributions is significantly higher in Mutual-Punish than 
Baseline (p = 0.001), the differences between proportions in the centralized monitoring 
treatments and Baseline are not significant (Central-Reward versus Baseline, p = 0.255; 
Central-Punish versus Baseline, p = 0.128). The reason for this is not so much the size of the 
effect (though as Figure 2 shows, there is a considerable difference in this respect), but rather 
the reliability of the effect. In nine of ten Mutual-Punish groups maximal contributions are 
observed as often as not, while the same can be said of only one Baseline group. In the 
centralized monitoring treatments there is more heterogeneity. In each treatment there are four 
groups that look like Mutual-Punish groups in terms of their propensity to contribute fully, and 
six groups that look like Baseline groups. 
This heterogeneity across groups in contribution behavior translates into heterogeneity in 
earnings. In principle, a group could earn as much as 144 points per group member per period, 
and in fact two groups in Mutual-Punish achieved this, but there was considerable variability in 
actual earnings among the other groups. Figure 3 presents box-and-whiskers diagrams for the 
14 
distribution of group earnings, where the box shows the lower quartile, median, and upper 
quartile of attained group earnings.16 
 
B a s e l i n e  M u t u a l - R e w a r d  C e n t r a l - R e w a r d  M u t u a l - P u n i s h  C e n t r a l - P u n i s h  
Figure 3. Box plots of group performance. Group performance is measured by earnings per 
group member per period. 
Relative to Baseline, earnings are higher and less variable in the Mutual-Punish treatment. 
It is worth noting that even in the short horizon of the experiment, earnings are significantly 
higher in Mutual-Punish than Baseline (p = 0.008). The diagrams also show that centralized 
monitoring leads to more variable group performances than the other treatments. Apparently, 
when placed in the role of central monitor some players used the strategy of contributing fully 
and disciplining free-riders, and successfully managed a cooperative group. At the same time, 
other central monitors failed either because they used punishments or rewards ineffectively, or 
because they did not try to use them at all. This result underlines the importance of differences in 
leadership qualities across individuals. This was previously noted by van der Heijden et al. 
(2009), who also observed a mixtuUHRIµJRRG¶DQG
EDG
OHDGHUV2YHUDOOOHDGHUVKLSVHHPHG
much more effective in their study, although the power technology of the leaders is very different 
across studies. An interesting avenue for further research could be to identify the psychological 
mechanisms underlying differences in leadership quality. 
16
 The whiskers represent the lowest (highest) observation still within 1.5 times the inter-quartile range of the lower 
(upper) quartile. One outlier is indicated in the Punish treatment. 
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Next we examine how rewards and punishments were directed. Figure 4 shows that the 
number of reward/punishment tokens a subject receives is sensitive to how her contribution 
relates to the average contribution of the rest of her group. 
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Figure 4. Reward/punishment tokens received. Numbers above bars indicate the number of 
cases in each interval. 
The patterns in the mutual monitoring treatments are similar to previous experiments. Group 
members are punished more heavily the lower is their contribution relative to the average 
contributed by the rest of their group, and rewards are mainly targeted at those who contribute at 
or above the average contributed by the rest. However, large deviations below the average of 
RWKHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVDUHSXQLVKHGPRUHKHDYLO\WKDQFRRSHUDWRUVDUHUHZDUGHG2QDYHUDJHLID
player free-rides rather than contributes fully in a group where the others contribute fully, she 
receives more than 20 points of punishment in Mutual-Punish but forgoes far less than 20 points 
of rewards in Mutual-Reward. There is a noticeable difference in the way incentives are used in 
the Central-Punish treatment, where punishments are more frequently meted out against group 
16 
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members who contribute above the group average. Such anti-social punishment has been shown 
to be detrimental to cooperation in mutual monitoring environments (see section 2 above).17 
The effectiveness of punishment and rewards depends crucially on how players respond to 
the use of these incentives. Figure 5 shows how individuals change their contributions in 
response to punishment/reward received in the previous period. We distinguish between those 
subjects who give less than, the same as, and more than, the group average. In the punishment 
treatments those who contribute less than the group average tend to increase their contribution in 
response to being punished. In Mutual-Punish there is very little punishment of those who 
contribute at or above the average of the rest of their group, but in Central-Punish these players 
are sometimes punished and they tend to respond by decreasing their contribution. In the reward 
treatments those that contribute less than the average of the rest of their group do not change 
their contribution much, while those who contribute at or above the average of the rest of the 
group tHQGWRGHFUHDVHWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQLIWKH\GRQ¶WJHWUHZDUGHG7KLVDV\PPHWU\LQWKH
response to rewards may explain why they have little impact in sustaining cooperation. 
In summary, our new experiment finds that peer-to-peer punishment is an effective 
mechanism for promoting cooperation, whereas peer-to-peer rewards are much less effective. 
Our treatments with concentrated reward/punishment power were designed so that central 
monitors had both an incentive to induce cooperation, and sufficient resources to be able to 
incentivize cooperation, by other group members. Nevertheless, cooperation in these treatments 
is not significantly higher than in our Baseline. 
17
 Although some potential explanations for anti-social punishment cannot operate in a centralized monitoring 
environment (e.g. revenge for being punished in previous periods, or pre-emptive retaliation by free-riders who 
expect to get punished), some others can (e.g. a dislike of non-conformism). It is difficult to explain why anti-social 
punishment is more prevalent with centralized as opposed to mutual monitoring. One possibility is that players can 
discipline anti-social punishers in the mutual monitoring environment by punishing them in subsequent periods, 
while the central monitor does not have to fear punishment. If so, then this suggests that the possibility to discipline 
central monitors (for example by voting them out of office) might reduce anti-social punishment by central 
monitors. We chose to appoint central monitors randomly for purposes of experimental control, but future research 
could examine how the effectiveness of central monitors depends on the way they are appointed. 
17 
 Figure 5. Response to reward/punishment tokens received. For each treatment we show three separate OLS regression lines, one based on data from players who contributed less 
than the average of the other members of their group (leftmost panel), one for players who contributed the same as the average of the other group members (middle panel), and 
one for players who contributed more than the average of the other group members (rightmost panel). 
1 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We reviewed evidence on the effectiveness of discretionary incentives to promote 
cooperation. A large literature in economics shows that decentralized (peer-to-peer) punishments 
can be effective in raising contributions and earnings. Previous studies have emphasized the 
importance of high-power incentives and/or long time horizons for the success of punishment 
institutions. Our new experiment shows that punishments can be effective even within a context 
RIDµORZSRZHU¶LQFHQWLYHV\VWHPZLWKDLPSDFW-to-cost ratio) and short horizon (10 
periods). Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, peer-to-peer punishment elicited (and maintained) high 
levels of cooperation from very early in the game, indicating that the threat of punishment seems 
almost instantly recognized by our subjects. Peer-to-peer rewards, on the other hand, have not 
been studied as extensively. While high-power rewards are as effective as high-power 
punishments, most studies find that low-power rewards are ineffective. Our new experiment with 
low-power rewards confirms this. 
Our primary focus, however, is to compare these decentralized incentive systems with 
centralized systems. Centralized systems have natural manifestations in the organization of teams 
and small groups and societies, where the administration of incentive power is delegated to 
VXEVHWVRIJURXSPHPEHUVZKLFKZHUHIHUWRDVµFHQWUDOPRQLWRUV¶3HUKDSVVXUSULVLQJO\
centralized systems have been relatively overlooked in the literature. Existing evidence suggests 
that concentrating incentive power may enhance efficiency. However, some of the findings 
caution that conferring all reward or punishment power on one individual is risky: some 
individuals are found to abuse (or at least, fail to use effectively) their incentive power, with 
detrimental consequences for cooperation. Our new experiment finds that concentrating 
punishment power clearly reduces its effectiveness, while concentrating reward power slightly 
raises its effectiveness, albeit not significantly. 
The poor performance of centralized institutions in our setting may partly reflect the 
specific details of the decision environment studied in our experiment. For example, for 
centralized institutions to be successful central monitors must have a sufficient incentive to use 
rather than keep for themselves the group resources earmarked for the disciplining activity. This 
³LQFHQWLYHWRGLVFLSOLQH´LVVHQVLWLYHWRWKHSDUDPHWHUVRIWKHGHFLVLRQHQYLURQPHQW)RUH[DPSOH
in our setting the incentive to discipline increases with the size of the group, ceteris paribus. 
17 
Thus, centralized institutions may be found to be more effective in settings where central 
monitors control larger groups. Another condition for centralized institutions to be successful is 
that central monitors have sufficient disciplining power to induce a player who only cares about 
KHURZQPDWHULDOSD\RIIWRFRQWULEXWH7KLV³DELOLW\WRGLVFLSOLQH´LVDOVRVHQVLWLYHWRWKH
parameters of the decision setting. For example, in our experiment the ability to discipline 
increases in the amount of resources earmarked for the disciplining activity. Thus, central 
monitors may be more successful in settings where they control a larger amount of resources. 
Our new experiment also finds considerable heterogeneity in group performance when 
power is centralized: while some groups perform well under a central monitor, in other groups 
central monitors simply keep to themselves resources that can be used to discipline others. To the 
extent that central monitors advance their own material payoff by keeping these resources and 
not using them to incentivize cooperation through the disciplining of free-riders, this can be 
viewed as an abuse of their power. This highlights the importance of designing appropriate 
constraints to the ability of monitors to abuse their power. Centralized systems should not be 
transformed into autocratic systems where monitors cannot be held accountable for their use of 
group resources. On the contrary, centralized systems should have built-in mechanisms to allow 
group members to oversee the conduct of those who are empowered with disciplining authority. 
Another source of failure in our central monitoring treatments comes from monitors who 
use the resources erratically and thus fail to establish a clear norm of cooperation. This creates 
uncertainty about whether actions will be punished and/or rewarded and this may undermine the 
usefulness of incentives. Such uncertainty could be reduced if monitors could use other devices 
(such as communication) to induce norms of cooperation and explain the likely consequences of 
adhering or deviating from these norms. Nevertheless, we suspect that some monitors would still 
fail even with unlimited opportunities to communicate their intentions. 
This points to the importance of selecting the right individuals for the role of monitor. Thus, 
how monitors are appointed is an important feature of centralized systems. For example, systems 
where the monitoring role is assigned to group members on a rotating basis may limit the negative 
LPSDFWRIµEDGPRQLWRUV¶DQGWKXVKDYHDQDGYDQWDJHRYHUV\VWHPVZLWKFRQVROLGDWHGSRZHU
positions. The appointment of central monitors through democratic elections (as it happened for 
captains and quartermasters in pirate societies) may be another mechanism that allows group 
members to screen out candidate monitors who are likely to abuse their power. 
18 
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APPENDIX ± Experimental Instructions 
[ALL TREATMENTS] 
Instructions 
Welcome! 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. Please do not talk to any of the other participants until 
the experiment is over. If you have a question at any time please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
your desk to answer it. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be matched with two other people, randomly selected from the 
participants in this room, to form a group of three. The composition of your group will stay the same throughout 
the experiment, i.e. you will form a group with the same two other participants during the whole experiment. Each 
SHUVRQLQWKHJURXSZLOOEHUDQGRPO\DVVLJQHGDUROHHLWKHUµJURXSPHPEHU$¶µJURXSPHPEHU%¶ RUµJURXSPHPEHU
&¶Your role will stay the same throughout the experiment. Your earnings will depend on the decisions made 
within your group, as described below. Your earnings will not be affected by decisions made in other groups. All 
decisions are made anonymously and you will not learn the identity of the other participants in your group. You will 
EHLGHQWLILHGVLPSO\DVµJURXSPHPEHU$¶µJURXSPHPEHU%¶DQGµJURXSPHPEHU&¶ 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be informed of your role and given an initial balance of 320 points. The 
experiment will then consist of 10 periods, and in each period you can earn additional points. At the end of the 
H[SHULPHQWHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW¶VLQLWLDOEDODQFHSOXVDFFXPXODWHGSRLQWHDUQLQJVIURPDOOSHULRGVZLOOEe converted into 
cash at the exchange rate of 0.75 pence per point. Each participant will be paid in cash and in private. 
Description of a period 
Every period has the same structure and has two stages. 
Stage One 
In Stage One of each period you will be endowed with 20 tokens. 
You must choose how many of these tokens to allocate to a group account and how many to keep in your private 
account. 
Similarly, the other two members of your group will be endowed with 20 tokens each and must choose how many 
tokens to allocate to the group account and how many to keep in their private accounts. 
You will make your decision by entering the number of tokens you allocate to the group account. Any tokens you do 
not allocate to the group account will automatically be kept in your private account. You enter your decisions on a 
screen like the one shown below. 
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 Earnings from Stage One will be determined as follows: 
For each token you keep in your private account you will earn 3 points. 
For each token you allocate to the group account you and the other two members of your group will earn 2 points 
each. 
Similarly, for each token another group member keeps in his or her private account this group member will earn 3 
points, and for each token he or she allocates to the group account all three group members will earn 2 points each. 
Your point earnings from Stage One will be the sum of your earnings from your private account and the group 
account. 
Thus: 
Your point earnings from Stage One = 3 x (number of tokens kept in your private account) + 2 x 
(total number of tokens allocated to the group account by yourself and the other two members of 
your group). 
Before we describe Stage Two we want to check that each participant understands how earnings from Stage 
One will be calculated. To do this we ask you to answer the questions below. In a couple of minutes the 
experimenter will check your answers. When each participant has answered all questions correctly we will 
continue with the instructions. 
Stage One Questions 
1. How many periods will there be in the experiment? ____ 
2. How many people are in your group (including yourself)? ____ 
3. Will you be matched with the same or different people in every period? (circle one) 
SAME DIFFERENT 
4. Suppose in Stage One of a period each group member allocates 0 tokens to the group account. 
How many tokens does A keep in his or her private account? _______ 
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:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURPKLVRUKHUSULYDWHDFFRXQW" 
What is the total number of tokens allocated to the group account? 
:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURPWKHJURXSDFFRXQW" 
:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH2QH" 
5. Suppose in Stage One of a period each group member allocates 20 tokens to the group account. 
How many tokens does A keep in his or her private account? _______ 
:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURPKLVRUKHUSULYDWHaccount? _______ 
What is the total number of tokens allocated to the group account? _______ 
:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURPWKHJURXSDFFRXQW" _______ 
:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH2QH" _______ 
6. Suppose A allocates 16 tokens to the group account, B allocates 10 tokens to the group account, and C allocates 4 
tokens to the group account. 
How many tokens does A keep in his or her private account? 
:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURPKLVRUKHUSULYDWHDFFRunt? 
What is the total number of tokens allocated to the group 
DFFRXQW":KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURPWKHJURXSDFFRXQW"
:KDWZLOOEH$¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH2QH" 
[BASELINE] 
Stage Two 
At the beginning of Stage Two you will be informed of the decisions made by each group member and their 
earnings from Stage One in a screen like the one below. 
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In Stage Two of each period you will be endowed with 8 additional tokens. These will automatically be placed in 
your private account from which you earn 3 points per token. Thus you will earn an additional 24 points in Stage 
Two. 
Similarly, the other group members will be endowed with 8 additional tokens each, which will be automatically 
placed in their private accounts from which they earn 3 points per token. Thus the other group members will earn an 
additional 24 points each in Stage Two. 
Neither you nor the other group members make any decisions in Stage Two. 
Ending the period 
At the end of Stage Two the computer will inform you of your total earnings for the period. Your period earnings 
will be the sum of your earnings from Stage One and Stage Two. 
At the end of period 10 your accumulated point earnings from all periods will be added to your initial balance of 320 
points to give your total point earnings for the experiment. These will be converted into cash at the exchange rate of 
0.75 pence per point. Each participant will be paid in cash and in private. 
[MUTUAL-PUNISH / MUTUAL-REWARD] 
Stage Two 
At the beginning of Stage Two you will be informed of the decisions made by each group member and their 
earnings from Stage One. 
In Stage Two of each period you will be endowed with 8 additional tokens. You must choose how many of these to 
use to [punish] [reward] group members and how many to keep in your private account. 
Similarly, the other group members will be endowed with 8 additional tokens each and must choose how many of 
these to use to [punish] [reward] group members and how many to keep in their private accounts. 
You make your decision by completing a screen like the one below. You choose how many tokens to assign to each 
group member. You can assign tokens to yourself if you want. Any of the 8 additional tokens not assigned will 
automatically be kept in your private account. You cannot assign more than 8 tokens in total. 
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Earnings from Stage Two will be determined as follows: 
For each additional token you keep in your private account you will earn 3 points. 
For each token you assign to a group member that group member¶VHDUQLQJVZLOOEH>UHGXFHG@>LQFUHDVHG@E\
points. 
Similarly, for each additional token another group member keeps in his or her private account this group member 
will earn 3 points, and for each token he or she assigns to a group member that group memEHU¶VHDUQLQJVZLOOEH
[decreased] [increased] by 3 points. 
Thus: 
Your point earnings from Stage Two = 3 x (number of additional tokens kept in your private account) 
[-] [+] 3 x (total number of tokens assigned to you by all group members in Stage Two). 
We want to check that each participant understands how their earnings from Stage Two will be calculated. To do 
this we ask you to answer the questions below. In a couple of minutes the experimenter will check your answers. 
When each participant has answered all questions correctly we will continue with the instructions. 
Stage Two Questions 
Suppose in Stage Two of a period A assigns 2 tokens to B and 2 tokens to C. B assigns 2 tokens to B and 6 tokens to 
C. C assigns 8 tokens to B. 
1. How many tokens does A keep in his or her private account? ______ 
2. What is the total number of tokens assigned to A? ______ 
3. :KDWZLOOEHJURXSPHPEHU$¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR" ______ 
4. How many tokens does B keep in his or her private account? ______ 
5. What is the total number of tokens assigned to B? ______ 
6. :KDWZLOOEHJURXSPHPEHU%¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR" ______ 
7. How many tokens does C keep in his or her private account? ______ 
8. What is the total number of tokens assigned to C? ______ 
9. What will be group PHPEHU&¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR" ______ 
Ending the period 
At the end of Stage Two the computer will inform you of all decisions made in Stage Two and the earnings of each 
member of your group for Stage Two. The computer will then inform you of your total earnings for the period. Your 
period earnings will be the sum of your earnings from Stage One and Stage Two. 
At the end of period 10 your accumulated point earnings from all periods will be added to your initial balance of 320 
points to give your total point earnings for the experiment. These will be converted into cash at the exchange rate of 
0.75 pence per point. [Although your earnings in some periods may be negative, your initial balance ensures that 
your final earnings for the experiment cannot be negative.] Each participant will be paid in cash and in private. 
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[CENTRAL-PUNISH / CENTRAL -REWARD] 
Stage Two 
At the beginning of Stage Two you will be informed of the decisions made by each group member and their 
earnings from Stage One. 
In Stage Two of each period group member A will be endowed with 24 additional tokens. Group member A must 
choose how many of these to use to [punish] [reward] group members and how many to keep in his or her private 
account. Group members B and C do not make any decisions in Stage Two. 
If you are group member A, you make your decision by completing a screen like the one below. You choose how 
many tokens to assign to each group member. You can assign tokens to yourself if you want. Any of the 24 
additional tokens not assigned will automatically be kept in your private account. You cannot assign more than 24 
tokens in total. 
 
Earnings from Stage Two will be determined as follows: 
For each additional token A keeps in his or her private account he or she will earn 3 points. 
)RUHDFKWRNHQ$DVVLJQVWRDJURXSPHPEHUWKDWJURXSPHPEHU¶VHDUQLQJVZLOOEH>GHFUHDVHG@>LQFUHDVHG@E\3 
points. 
Thus: 
$¶VSRLQWHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR [QXPEHURIDGGLWLRQDOWRNHQVNHSWLQ$¶VSULYDWHDFFRXQW>±] 
[+] 3 x (number of additional tokens A assigns to himself or herself) 
%¶VSRLQWHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR >±] [+] 3 x (number of additional tokens assigned to B by group 
member A). 
&¶VSRLQWHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR >±] [+] 3 x (number of additional tokens assigned to C by group 
member A). 
We want to check that each participant understands how their earnings from Stage Two will be calculated. To do 
this we ask you to answer the questions below. In a couple of minutes the experimenter will check your answers. 
When each participant has answered all questions correctly we will continue with the instructions. 
Stage Two Questions 
Suppose in Stage Two of a period A assigns 12 tokens to B and 8 tokens to C. 
1. How many tokens does A keep in his or her private account? 
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2. What is the total number of tokens assigned to A? 
3. :KDWZLOOEHJURXSPHPEHU$¶VHDUQLQJVIURm Stage Two? 
4. What is the total number of tokens assigned to B? 
5. :KDWZLOOEHJURXSPHPEHU%¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR" 
6. What is the total number of tokens assigned to C? 
7. :KDWZLOOEHJURXSPHPEHU&¶VHDUQLQJVIURP6WDJH7ZR" 
Ending the period 
At the end of Stage Two the computer will inform you of all decisions made in Stage Two and the earnings of each 
member of your group for Stage Two. The computer will then inform you of your total earnings for the period. Your 
period earnings will be the sum of your earnings from Stage One and Stage Two. 
At the end of period 10 your accumulated point earnings from all periods will be added to your initial balance of 320 
points to give your total point earnings for the experiment. These will be converted into cash at the exchange rate of 
0.75 pence per point. [Although your earnings in some periods may be negative, your initial balance ensures that 
your final earnings for the experiment cannot be negative.] Each participant will be paid in cash and in private. 
[ALL TREATMENTS] 
Beginning the experiment 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk to answer it. 
We are now ready to begin the decision-making part of the experiment. Please look at your computer screen and 
begin making your decisions. 
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